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A HOBBESIAN BUNDLE OF LOCKEAN STICKS: THE 
PROPERTY RIGHTS LEGACY OF JUSTICE SCALIA 
J. Peter Byrne*† 
INTRODUCTION 
No modern United States Supreme Court Justice has stimulated more 
thought and debate about the constitutional meaning of property than 
Antonin Scalia. He sought to change the prevailing interpretation of the 
Takings Clause. In doing so, he grounded it in clear rules embodying a 
reactionary defense of private owners’ prerogatives against environmental 
and land use regulation. While adamant about the importance of property as 
a civil right, he displayed little interest in the complexities of property law as 
a nuanced, dynamic, and sometimes contested body of law, defining rights 
among people in places and things. Fundamentally, he viewed property from 
a public law perspective, rather than from a private law perspective. He 
sought to enhance its constitutional role as a bulwark of liberty against 
government. Thus, he aimed to recast the regulatory takings doctrine in clear 
constitutional rules, which authorized federal judicial oversight for state 
property law developments, whether through legislative or judicial 
innovation. 
Justice Scalia authored only two opinions for the Court construing the 
Takings Clause: Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,1 and Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council.2 He also penned one plurality opinion, one 
dissent, and four separate opinions.3 He probably was not the most influential 
justice in shaping contemporary regulatory takings doctrine, a distinction 
more arguably due to Chief Justice Rehnquist4 or to Justice Stevens.5 But 
                                                                                                                 
 *  J. Hampton Baumgartner, Jr., Chair in Real Property, Georgetown University Law Center. 
 †  Thanks to Nicole Garnett and John Echeverria for sharing thoughts on Justice Scalia and 
takings, and to participants in the Oxford University Property Law Discussion Group for comments. 
 1. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987). 
 2. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006 (1992). 
 3. See infra notes 33, 35, 37, 45, 143, 145 (identifying examples of opinions that Scalia 
authored). 
 4. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 377 (1994) (clarifying the required nexus 
“between the exactions imposed by the city and the projected impacts of the proposed development” in 
regulatory takings cases); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cty. of L.A., 482 
U.S. 304, 305 (1987) (discussing the regulatory takings doctrine); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 
164, 165 (1979) (holding that, although the government has domain over navigable waters, it cannot force 
a marina to be open to the public without compensation); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 
U.S. 104, 138 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority that the State’s Landmark 
Law, which limited development, did not constitute a taking). 
 5. See Tahoe–Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 305 (2002) 
(applying the regulatory takings doctrine to a moratorium on development); Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 473–74 (1987) (deciding whether a Pennsylvania statute seeking to 
protect the public interest from harm caused by coal mines violates the Takings Clause). 
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Scalia’s various opinions shaped critical perceptions about regulatory takings 
because his approach was conceptually ambitious. His vivid rhetoric also 
seemed to foretell more radical reinterpretations of private property’s role in 
the constitutional order. His plurality and separate opinions present a revival 
of the high formalist approach to property rights prevalent in the Supreme 
Court prior to the New Deal. He justified his approach through extraordinary 
pessimism about democratic self-government. Thus, an assessment of his 
legacy in this area requires an understanding of his distinctive vision and its 
limitations. 
This essay will highlight three distinct features of Scalia’s approach to 
regulatory takings interpretation.6 First, it will review his eschewing of any 
interpretation based on the original meaning of the Takings Clause. The fact 
of this departure has been previously observed,7 but its significance in the 
takings field has not been fully considered. Second, it is important to consider 
his embrace of per se rules in a field previously swamped by ad hoc decisions. 
Finally, this essay examines and assesses Scalia’s conceptualization of state 
property law as a fixed body of clear rules. This last topic raises important 
questions both about the nature of law, including common law, and also 
about federalism. In hindsight, Scalia stands in a long tradition of 
conservative judges in seeking specious constitutional grounds by which to 
restrain innovation. The intellectual means he used, however, reflect distinct 
jurisprudential and policy challenges in our contemporary period. These are 
primarily the legacy of legal realism and the growth of environmental 
regulation. 
I. UNTROUBLED DEPARTURE FROM ORIGINAL MEANING 
By now it is well-understood that the regulatory takings doctrine has no 
basis in the original meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.8 
Dean Treanor showed long ago that the Takings Clause, as originally 
understood, “required compensation when the federal government physically 
took private property, but not when government regulations limited the ways 
in which property could be used.”9 Treanor argued that, at the time, the Court 
                                                                                                                 
6. Scalia joined the dissent in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472, 494 (2005), the 
Court’s only important Takings Clause decision addressing actual expropriation rather than regulation of 
use during his tenure, but he did not write the opinion. 
7. E.g., Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 
U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 12 (2006) (explaining Scalia’s lack of adherence to traditional originalist philosophy). 
 8. The Takings Clause reads: “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 9. William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the 
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 782 (1995). Treanor suggests a “translation” of the original 
meaning for contemporary review of use regulations focusing on minority owners systematically 
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understood the Takings Clause only to require the government to compensate 
for expropriated property.10 He further argued that, at the time of the adoption 
of the Bill of Rights and throughout the early Republic, land use regulations 
were common and appropriate.11 Even though some scholars have contested 
this dominant interpretation of its original meaning (unconvincingly in my 
view),12 the Supreme Court itself consistently held that the Takings Clause 
did not reach land-use regulation until its unexplained and ambiguous 
embrace of a regulatory takings doctrine in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon.13 
Indeed, Justice Scalia himself readily acknowledged that, prior to 
Pennsylvania Coal, “it was generally thought that the Takings Clause 
reached only a ‘direct appropriation’ of property, or the functional equivalent 
of a ‘practical ouster of [the owner’s] possession.’”14 
Scalia nonetheless justified applying the Clause to regulations of use, 
not on any revised claim about its original meaning, but on the need to adapt 
the clause to modern conditions of comprehensive regulation. His assessment 
of property use regulations was warped by his fear that if “the uses of private 
property were subject to unbridled, uncompensated qualification under the 
                                                                                                                 
disadvantaged in the political process, an approach finding no resonance in Justice Scalia’s decisions. Id. 
at 859–79. 
 10. Id. at 839. 
 11. Id. at 792. This view has had additional support. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S 
WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 1, 3, 6, 10, 16 (1996) (describing 
19th century property rights and how they evolved); John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic 
and the Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1100 (2000) (discussing land 
use regulation in the United States around the time the Constitution and Bill of Rights were adopted). 
 12. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Law Property Rights, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1549 (2003) (examining “federal regulatory-takings law in light of” cases decided 
on “Founding Era principles of natural law”); Kris W. Kobach, The Origins of Regulatory Takings: Setting 
the Record Straight, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 1211, 1286–87 (1996) (describing ante bellum state court 
applications of state constitutional provisions to government actions that reduce the value of private 
property). 
 13. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). “A prohibition simply upon the use of 
property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety 
of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the 
public benefit.” Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668–69 (1887). 
 14. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (citation omitted) (citing Legal 
Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 551 (1871)). Scalia also wrote in Lucas: “Justice Blackmun is correct that 
early constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of property at 
all . . . .” Id. at 1028 n.15 (emphasis removed). He argued that such an objection was irrelevant because 
the Takings Clause was not incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment until Transportation Co. v. 
Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878) (“[T]he constitution of every State” has a restriction against “private 
property” being “taken for public use without just compensation . . . .”). This argument is extremely weak 
because states were construing identical or analogous language in state constitutions. Moreover, the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Takings Clause, not to include use regulations, was consistent with 
the early state interpretations before Mahon. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 407–08, 
414 (1915) (deciding that a state ordinance did not constitute a “taking” because “[t]here was no specific 
denial of the value of the property”); Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668–69 (1887) (discussing the limits of the 
takings doctrine). 
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police power, ‘the natural tendency of human nature [would be] to extend the 
qualification more and more until at last private property disappear[ed].’”15 
Thus, he justified applying the Takings Clause to use regulations on the basis 
of his perception of social need combined with a gross and dark 
generalization about of the inevitability of political overreaching.16 
Such disregard for the original meaning of the Takings Clause might not 
be a problem for many jurists, but it contradicts the approach to constitutional 
interpretation that Justice Scalia frequently invoked as essential, and which 
provided the foundation for some of his most consequential constitutional 
opinions.17 His commitment to the original meaning of the Bill of Rights was 
stated most emphatically in Heller v. District of Columbia, where he wrote 
the opinion for the Court. His opinion held that the Second Amendment 
protects an individual’s right to possess and bear firearms and invalidated 
statutes that prohibit keeping handguns in the home ready for immediate 
firing.18 Scalia grounded his opinion in what he took to be the original 
meaning of the Second Amendment.19 He emphasized that the meaning of 
the Amendment must be found in the words used, taken in their natural—
rather than technical—meaning, and in how they were understood at the time 
of enactment.20 To the plea that 18th century reliance on self-defense should 
not preclude reasonable contemporary judgments by police and legislatures 
about the contributions of modern firearms to urban criminal violence, Scalia 
replied: 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014 (emphasis in original) (quoting Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415). 
 16. The force of the latter point would seem to be weakened by the survival of private property 
in the United States before the Supreme Court applied the Takings Clause to use regulations. It is also 
undercut by thriving private property institutions in the many other countries that lack the vigorous U.S. 
regulatory takings doctrine, such as the United Kingdom and Canada. See RACHELLE ALTERMAN, 
TAKINGS INTERNATIONAL: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON LAND USE REGULATIONS AND 
COMPENSATION RIGHTS 27–29 (2010) (discussing regulatory takings laws in other countries, including 
Canada and the United Kingdom); J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory 
Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 86, 106–11 (1995) (comparing constitutional regulatory takings 
protections around the world); Bryan P. Schwartz & Melanie R. Bueckert, Regulatory Takings in Canada, 
5 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUDS. L. REV. 477, 477 (2006) (explaining that the Canadian regulatory takings 
doctrine is not robust). 
 17. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 852, 864 (1989) 
[hereinafter Scalia, Originalism] (arguing that an originalist approach to Constitutional interpretation 
renders more moderate decisions that take into account important historical support). Some scholars who 
are committed originalists have argued that Scalia in practice is either an inconsistent originalist or no 
originalist at all. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 7, at 24 (arguing that Scalia did not adhere to true 
originalism); Ilya Somin, Scalia and Constitutional Property Rights, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/15/justice-scalia-and-
constitutional-property-rights/?utm_term=.8ebaf39aafd6388dc85d5a53 (observing that although “Scalia 
is best known for his strong advocacy of originalism in constitutional law,” [h]is regulatory takings 
opinions largely rely on a combination of textual arguments, intuition, and precedent”). 
 18. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
 19. Id. at 624–25. 
 20. Id. at 584. 
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Undoubtedly some think that the Second Amendment is outmoded 
in a society where our standing army is the pride of our Nation, 
where well-trained police forces provide personal security, and 
where gun violence is a serious problem. That is perhaps 
debatable, but what is not debatable is that it is not the role of this 
Court to pronounce the Second Amendment extinct.21 
The essential principle expressed here is that the Court must give effect 
to constitutional provisions as they were understood at the time of adoption 
without regard to whether or not they satisfy contemporary needs. 
“Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to 
have when the people adopted them, whether future legislatures or (yes) even 
future judges think that scope too broad.”22 Scalia purported to follow this 
principle in constitutional adjudication and severely chastised other justices 
when he determined that they departed from it.23 
Regulatory takings is an area where Scalia most conspicuously departed 
from reliance on the original meaning of a constitutional text. He sought 
means to expand the Clause’s reach, rather than resist a doctrine admittedly 
inconsistent with the original and traditional understanding (before 1922). 
Thus, in Lucas, he justified the persistence of a regulatory takings doctrine 
on the need to restrain government from overreaching into property rights.24 
For him, use regulations present an ongoing “risk that private property is 
being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating 
serious public harm.”25 He rejected the Court’s consistent refusal before 1922 
to apply the Takings Clause to use regulations reasonably intended to prevent 
harm to the public: 
The “harmful or noxious uses” principle was the Court’s early 
attempt to describe in theoretical terms why government may, 
consistent with the Takings Clause, affect property values by 
regulation without incurring an obligation to compensate—a 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Id. at 636. 
 22. Id. at 634–35. 
 23. For example, in the pages of the United States Reporter immediately preceding his opinion 
in Lucas, Justice Scalia’s dissent in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania criticized the 
Court’s Due Process Clause retention of a woman’s right to abortion in some circumstances. In his dissent, 
Justice Scalia stated that the Court relied on “value judgments” rather than on the appropriate method of 
“reading text and discerning our society’s traditional understanding of that text.” Planned Parenthood of 
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000–01 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 24. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992). 
 25. Id. at 1018. 
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reality we nowadays acknowledge explicitly with respect to the 
full scope of the State’s police power.26 
Whatever the merits of this interpretation,27 it hardly comports with an 
interpretive commitment to “reading text and discerning our society’s 
traditional understanding of that text.”28 In Lucas, Scalia created a new per 
se rule condemning any regulation that eliminates all the economic value of 
a parcel of land. He created this rule without regard to the harm that 
government reasonably believed it was preventing unless the harm could 
constitute a common law nuisance.29 He justified this rule on loose dicta in a 
prior decision upholding restrictive zoning.30 
Justice Scalia formulated or advocated other new doctrines to strengthen 
the regulatory takings doctrine on behalf of property owners. He forged a 
federal constitutional limit on government conditioning the grant of a 
development permit on the owner conveying a property interest in 
mitigation.31 This innovation applied the Takings Clause to a practice long 
regulated by state constitutional law and reintroduced heightened means-
ends scrutiny into judicial review of property regulations. 
Scalia’s rhetoric and reasoning raised the specter of greater judicial 
scrutiny of land use regulations generally. He argued that the Takings Clause 
systematically imposed higher standards of review than the Due Process or 
Equal Protection Clauses, analogous to how express provisions of the Bill of 
Rights, such as the First Amendment, necessitated heightened scrutiny.32 He 
subsequently elaborated on this view in a separate opinion, where he 
advocated striking down a rent control ordinance because it offered 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Id. at 1022–23. 
 27. This raises a tangled doctrinal problem. Early cases, such as Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 
668 (1887), held that the Takings Clause does not apply to use regulations, but also applied a more robust 
application of the Due Process Clause as permitting regulations of property use to prevent harm to the 
public. The question of what a legislature could reasonably consider harm remained unclear. The Court 
eventually held that a state statute limiting the hours that a baker could work did not prevent harm to 
workers, but merely transferred valuable contract rights to them. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 46 
(1905). See also Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (characterizing the takings matter 
before the Court as a private interest issue to distinguish it from Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 
U.S. 531 (1914), which concerned a law addressing miners’ safety). 
 28. Casey, 505 U.S. at 1000 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 29. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. 
 30. As John Echeverria shows in another paper in this Issue, Justice Scalia heavily used the dicta 
in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), abrogated by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 
U.S. 528 (2005), that land use regulations effect a taking if they do not “substantially advance legitimate 
state interests.” John D. Echeverria, Antonin Scalia’s Flawed Takings Legacy, 41 VT. L. REV. 689, 696–
99 (2017). As Echeverria notes, this language is contained in a unanimous decision upholding a five-acre 
zoning scheme, issued at the very end of the term. Id. 
 31. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987). 
 32. Id. at 834–35. 
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additional protections to the old and infirm. He argued that any restriction on 
land use that did not mitigate a harm caused by the property owner must be 
held to be a taking per se.33 Such reasoning inflates an owner’s property rights 
to the status of an express constitutional guarantee, such as the free exercise 
of religion, even though the dimensions of property rights are defined and set 
by state law. The Federal Constitution addresses only the “taking” of 
property.34 His reasoning makes the courts a guardian of economic liberty, as 
in the Lochner era of substantive due process, a body of law Scalia otherwise 
eschewed. In the Lingle case, the Court unanimously rejected the means-ends 
Taking Clause scrutiny of use regulations, arguing this approach as 
indistinguishable from substantive Due Process.35 Indeed, in the Lingle oral 
argument, Scalia asked Deputy Solicitor General Edwin Kneedler whether 
the Court needed to “eat crow.”36 
Scalia also advocated for a rule finding a taking per se whenever a new 
statute or judicial innovation in the common law eliminated an established 
right of property. Thus, in Stop the Beach, he wrote for the plurality, 
upholding public title to a new dry sand beach. The State of Florida 
constructed the beach with public money to remedy erosion. The Court held 
that this would be a judicial taking of private littoral owners’ right to touch 
the water, unless the Supreme Court found it to be consistent with prior 
Florida common law rulings.37 This approach would institute remarkable 
federal supervision over state elaboration of its own common law. It failed, 
however, to become law because Justice Kennedy, often Scalia’s doctrinal 
nemesis, concurred only in the judgment.38 Scalia’s opinion makes two 
breathtaking extensions of the Takings Clause. First, it applies a clause 
admittedly directed primarily at specific property expropriations of 
identifiable individuals, such as when government condemns a parcel for a 
bridge, to changes in legal rules of general applicability.39 The change 
transforms a provision originally aimed at providing compensation to 
individuals unfairly burdened by the public into a control instrument over 
general legal developments. Second, Scalia’s opinion—for the first time—
                                                                                                                 
 33. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 18–24 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 34. Id. at 19. 
 35. Lingle, 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005). 
 36. Oral Argument at 22:48, Lingle, 544 U.S. 528 (2005), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-
163. 
 37. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 713–17 
(2010). 
 38. Id. at 733–34. Kennedy concurred in some parts of the plurality opinion, but not the parts 
defining a judicial taking. 
 39. Id. at 720–22. 
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applies the Takings Clause to state court judges’ decisions interpreting their 
own law.40 
Scalia’s opinion in Stop the Beach provides the fullest statement of his 
judicial takings doctrine. He frankly admits there that, “the Framers did not 
envision the Takings Clause would apply to judicial action.”41 He justifies 
embracing the doctrine nonetheless on the extraordinarily naïve or 
disingenuous claim that “the Constitution was adopted in an era when courts 
had no power to ‘change’ the common law.”42 He adds the bizarre textual 
argument that the Clause literally does not restrict its command to any 
category of state officials.43 But it is one thing to read language of the Fifth 
Amendment as not foreclosing such an interpretation, and quite another to 
read its employment of the passive voice as justifying such an interpretation. 
Public meaning at the time of the adoption, not linguistic acrobatics, should 
inform original meaning interpretations of constitutional provisions.44 The 
original meaning of the Clause required compensation for expropriation, a 
power of the legislature (which can be delegated to the executive), and not 
the judiciary. When the Fifth Amendment was adopted, no one would have 
imagined that it applied to judges interpreting the common law in deciding 
cases. 
Scalia also argued unsuccessfully for other, more minor doctrinal 
changes advantageous to property owners.45 The Supreme Court held in 
Palazollo that there was no per se rule barring an owner from bringing a 
regulatory takings claim if the owner obtained title after the regulation went 
into effect; the Court stated that the time of title acquisition should be 
considered in every case as part of the owner’s reasonable investment backed 
expectations.46 Scalia argued in a separate opinion that the timing of title 
acquisition should never weigh against the merits of a takings claim.47 In 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Id. at 714–15. 
 41. Id. at 722. 
 42. Id. The absurdity of this claim as a matter of legal history is explained in J. Peter Byrne, Stop 
the Stop the Beach Plurality!, 38 ECOLOGY L Q. 619, 622 (2011) [hereinafter Byrne, Stop the Stop the 
Beach Plurality]. 
 43. Id. at 713–14. 
 44. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOYOLA L. REV. 611, 
620 (1999) (claiming that originalism is now based on the “original meaning of the text,” not the 
“subjective intentions of the framers”). 
 45. See Palazzollo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 637 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing 
that in cases of regulatory takings, the Court should consider a property restriction without regard to  when 
the current owner took title to determine substantiality of the restriction);  Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 750 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (claiming that he “would resolve the question 
of whether there has been a ‘final decision’ in this case by looking only to the fixing of petitioner’s rights 
to use and develop her land”). 
 46. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626, 630. 
 47. Id. at 636–37 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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doing so, he explicitly distinguished his views from those of his more 
moderate conservative colleagues, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy.48 In a 
concurring opinion in Suitum, he urged the Court to reverse its earlier 
decision in Penn Central, which held that transferable development rights 
(TDRs) should be considered as part of the owner’s property “as a whole.”49 
He argued rather, following Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Penn Central,50 
that courts should characterize TDRs granted to an owner as compensation 
for a taking, rather than as rights retained as part of a regulatory program, 
which militate against a court concluding that the regulation effects a 
taking.51 The effect of Scalia’s view would be to treat more regulations as 
takings, despite the economic value retained by the owner.52 Interestingly, 
Rehnquist did not join Scalia’s separate opinion in Suitum.53 
None of these doctrinal innovations or elaborations have anything to do 
with original meaning. In each, Scalia sought to simplify rules, making it 
easier for property owners to prevail. He advocated for them with 
characteristic rhetorical vigor that encouraged property rights advocates, 
terrified regulators and environmentalists, and enriched scholarly debate 
about constitutional property.54 Scalia’s new rules and proposed departures 
constitute judicial activism on a scale comparable to Warren or Burger Court 
innovations, such as Miranda warnings or substantive due process 
protections for abortion rights. Yet, Scalia excoriated these departures from 
original meaning as judicial activism.55 
Scalia never offered an explanation for why he played such an active 
role in seeking to refashion the regulatory takings field. In a law review 
article, he wrote: “Our modern society is undoubtedly not as enthusiastic 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Id. at 636. See also Richard J. Lazarus, The Measure of a Justice: Justice Scalia and the 
Faltering of the Property Rights Movement Within the U.S. Supreme Court, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 759, 816–
17 (2006) (discussing Scalia’s isolation in Palazollo). 
 49. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 749 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 50. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 51. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 749–50 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 52. J. Peter Byrne, Judicial Activism in the Regulatory Takings Opinions of Justice Scalia, 1 
GEO. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 93, 94 (2002). 
 53. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 745 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also Lazarus, supra note 48, at 814–15 
(speculating that Rehnquist gave writing the opinion for the Court to Justice Souter, rather than to Scalia, 
to secure a narrower opinion that would garner a larger majority). 
 54. See, e.g., Palazzollo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 637 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(proposing an analysis of preexisting property restrictions that favors property owners); Lucas v. S.C. 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025 (1992) (noting that protecting land for ecological purposes can still 
constitute a taking). 
 55. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444, 465 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(claiming that the majority decision stretches beyond the bounds of the Constitution); Planned Parenthood 
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000–01 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of making 
“value judgments” instead of interpreting the text of the law). 
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about economic liberties as were the men and women of 1789; but we should 
not fool ourselves into believing that because we like the result the result 
does not represent a contraction of liberty.”56 Perhaps Scalia, like some other 
conservative thinkers, viewed the Constitution as highly protective of private 
property through its structural principles and such specific, but under-
enforced, provisions, as the Privileges and Immunities Clause.57 Given that 
the general tenor of judicial interpretation over the years has enhanced both 
federal and state regulatory authority, Scalia may have seen expanding the 
power of the regulatory takings doctrine as restoring the primacy of private 
property in the overall constitutional scheme. This may be hinted at in his 
invocation of “the historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has 
become part of our constitutional culture.”58 This essay further explores that 
hypothesis below, discussing Scalia’s positing the common law of property 
as threatened by legislative authority.59 
II. A REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE OF PER SE RULES 
Given his general approaches to constitutional doctrine, it is not 
surprising that Scalia often fashioned or advocated for clearly defined rules 
for regulatory takings. In a law review article, he argued that clear rules 
contribute to the rule of law by decreasing judicial discretion in individual 
cases: 
[W]hen, in writing for the majority of the Court, I adopt a general 
rule, and say, “This is the basis of our decision,” I not only 
constrain lower courts, I constrain myself as well. If the next case 
should have such different facts that my political or policy 
preferences regarding the outcome are quite the opposite, I will be 
unable to indulge those preferences; I have committed myself to 
the governing principle. In the real world of appellate judging, it 
displays more judicial restraint to adopt such a course than to 
announce that, “on balance,” we think the law was violated here—
                                                                                                                 
 56. Scalia, Originalism, supra note 17, at 856. 
 57. See generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 43, 47 (3d ed. 2008) (describing how the Constitution 
was crafted to protect property rights, especially in light of revolutionary-era concerns). 
 58. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028. 
 59. See infra Part III (showing that Scalia relied on a “rigid common law baseline to assess” 
whether regulations effected takings). 
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leaving ourselves free to say in the next case that, “on balance,” it 
was not.60 
Scalia consistently adopted or argued for clear rules without any 
balancing of interests in his regulatory takings opinions. Conspicuous among 
these were the Lucas rule, providing that regulations that eliminate all 
economic value will be takings per se; the Stop the Beach plurality, holding 
that state judicial interpretations of state property law that eliminate an 
established property right are per se takings; and his concurrence in Pennell, 
arguing that rent control laws could never take into account tenant hardship 
without effecting a taking.61 
Undoubtedly he preferred such relatively clean rules in regulatory 
takings cases, reflecting his general concern that more standard-based 
approaches or balancing tests gave judges too much discretion to implement 
their own social views. Extraordinarily broad, fact-based standards have long 
dominated the regulatory takings arena, going back to Justice Holmes’s 
statement in Pennsylvania Coal that a regulation that “goes too far” 
constitutes a taking.62 This open-textured approach was canonized in Penn 
Central, when the Court admitted that it “quite simply, has been unable to 
develop any ‘set formula’ for determining” whether a regulation had effected 
a taking, but engaged in “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.”63 It seems 
plausible that simply as a matter of judicial function and aesthetics, this 
degree of vagueness irritated Justice Scalia. He believed that categorical rules 
advanced the rule of law by increasing predictability and shielding judges 
from making political calculations in individual cases.64 
Such jurisprudential concerns hardly explain the categorical rules Scalia 
actually advocated in the regulatory takings area. First, every one of his rules 
favors private property owners over public regulations. Indeed, each of them 
provides more protection than was granted private property under the Penn 
Central test. In most cases, his rules offer more complete protection to 
property owners than the approaches actually followed by the Court. For 
example, in Palazzolo, the Court held that a mere change of title after a 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179–80 (1989) 
[hereinafter Scalia, The Rule of Law]. 
 61. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 713–14 
(2010) (holding that the Takings Clause applies to court actions); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026–27 (arguing 
that a regulation constitutes a taking when that regulation “wholly eliminate[s] the value of the claimant’s 
land”); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1988) (questioning that a tenant hardship law’s 
application in “regulating the use of particular property so severely reduced the value of that property as 
to constitute a taking”). 
 62. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 63. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1977). 
 64. Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 60, at 1179. 
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regulation has been enacted cannot bar a regulatory takings claim, but courts 
must consider title changes in light of fairness to the owner’s reasonable 
expectations about lawful development.65 Scalia alone urged that a change of 
title should never impair a takings claim.66 As in other cases, Scalia’s 
movement toward a categorical rule would expand the ability of owners to 
prevail in regulatory takings claims, apart from a normative consideration of 
whether their particular economic losses “in all fairness and justice, should 
be borne by the public as a whole.”67 
Scalia’s rules often eliminate any room for the Court to assess the 
significance of public policy addressed by a regulation of private property. 
Thus, in Lucas, he held that a land use regulation cannot be upheld on the 
traditional ground (relied on by the South Carolina Supreme Court) that it 
protects the public from environmental or other harm.68 He dismissed the 
harm/benefit distinction as arbitrary and politically manipulable, so that the 
failure to allege that a regulation protects the public from harm results only 
from a legislature having a “stupid staff.”69 The effect of this is to require a 
court to ignore the public need for regulation whenever the regulation 
deprived the owner of all economic value, regardless of the degree of risk the 
owner’s use might pose.70 
At the same time, Scalia consistently described the public motivation for 
regulation in the most cynical terms and without any reference to the record 
in the case before him. He posited that government restrictions on private 
ownership are nearly always bad because government officials have a 
pathological desire to extend their authority indefinitely. He characterized 
the California Coastal Commission’s condition on a construction permit that 
required owners to allow the public to pass laterally on the beach behind their 
house as “extortion.”71 In Palazzolo, he referred to the government that 
diminishes private economic value as the “malefactor.”72 In Pennell, he 
stated more generally, “The politically attractive feature of regulation is not 
that it permits wealth transfers to be achieved that could not be achieved 
otherwise; but rather that it permits them to be achieved ‘off budget,’ with 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630 (2001). 
 66. Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 67. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 68. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1023–24 (1992). 
 69. Id. at 1026 n.12. 
 70. Scalia did allow that a regulation that duplicated a restriction inherent in the land title could 
eliminate all economic value without working a taking, because the owners never had a right to engage in 
such uses as a matter of property law. But this exception ignores the inadequacies of nuisance law and 
other common law limitations to deal with harms widely distributed upon the public. Nuisance law has 
shown itself powerless to address modern forms of environmental harm. 
 71. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). 
 72. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, at 637 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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relative invisibility and thus relative immunity from normal democratic 
processes.”73 Characteristically, Scalia disempowered the democratic 
process we actually have in service to some ideal of a perfectly efficient 
democracy we will never have, with the result that private power remains 
unchecked. 
Scalia’s rules also are indifferent to degree of economic harm that a 
regulation imposes on an owner. He replaced Penn Central’s primary focus 
on economic harm with an abstract conceptual protection of property. Nollan, 
for example, enshrined a logical nexus between the land use harm avoided 
and the condition imposed to test the constitutional validity of an exaction, 
rather than any economic harm to the owner.74 It was only in the subsequent 
Dolan (an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist) that the Court added a 
pragmatic test of whether the quantity of economic loss that the condition 
imposed on the owner was roughly proportional to the public harm avoided.75 
Similarly, the Court in Pennell (another opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist) 
remanded a case challenging a rent control ordinance to determine the 
economic effect on landlords. But Justice Scalia wrote an opinion urging that 
the ordinance effectuated a taking simply because it allowed the permitted 
rent to be based in part on hardship to the tenant.76 In his view, restricting the 
amount that the landlord could charge violated the Takings Clause whenever 
the restriction considered social needs not caused by the landlord.77 His 
dissent in Washington Legal Foundation argued that the Court should 
remedy a taking, even when the Court had found that the owners had suffered 
no economic harm, and thus were entitled to no compensation.78 Similarly, 
in Stop the Beach, Scalia was prepared to find a taking if the Florida courts 
changed their interpretation of the State’s common law of property to 
eliminate an established riparian right without any showing of harm to the 
upland owners.79 Lucas might be thought of as a strong exception to the 
indifference to economic harm to owners, because it announced a per se rule 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 22 (1988). 
 74. “Scalia put economic losses to the owners to one side and concentrated on the loss of personal 
dominion that comes from the inability to exclude others. He said little about the economic character of 
the Nollan’s [sic] loss, but much about the ‘extortion’ of trading permission to build for access rights.” J. 
Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 239, 247 (1990). 
 75. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 364, 391 (1994). 
 76. Pennell, 485 U.S. at 22 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 77. Id. at 21. 
 78. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 242–43 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 79. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 722 
(2010). Indeed, in oral argument, Justice Scalia pursued a line of questioning indicating that he thought 
that the landowners had gotten a “pretty good deal” from the beach restoration at public expense, even if 
their rights had been abrogated. Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. 702 (No. 
08-1151). 
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solely based on the regulation eliminating all of the land’s economic value.80 
However, the Supreme Court accepted, without analysis, the implausible 
finding of the trial court that Lucas had lost all of the property’s economic 
value. This left the concept of complete economic loss from regulation such 
an abstract concept that the Court came to construe it as applying to a 
vanishingly small category of cases.81 Thus, the Lucas rule plays no practical 
role in the economic protection of landowners. 
Thus, Scalia’s rule-based approach eliminates factual inquiry into either 
the significance of the government purposes for regulation, or the degree of 
economic loss that the regulation imposes on the owner. For this reason, he 
sought to invent remedies for regulatory takings other than government 
compensation. In the 1987 First English case, the Court had held that the 
Constitution required the government to pay compensation whenever a 
regulatory taking was found.82 Scalia needed to devise remedies to block 
government regulations when there was no showing that any compensation 
was due. Accordingly, he frequently came to suggest that offending 
regulations be invalidated or enjoined. 
Scalia’s approach also stacks the deck in favor of private property 
against government regulation. The government’s purpose is presumed to 
seek property without payment through cupidity. The owner can then 
complain about any diminishment of traditional property rights.83 Fashioning 
new hard rules consistently in one policy direction not only embodies social 
choices in the case in which they are announced, but also seeks to bind future 
courts to the same social choices by eliminating their room for maneuver.84 
Thus, contrary to what Justice Scalia claimed as a virtue of clear rules in 
constitutional adjudication, his regulatory takings rules embody his strong 
policy choice in the cases before him and seek to bind all future judges to the 
same policy choice.85  
Another practical significance of Scalia’s bright-line rules in regulatory 
takings cases is that they reduce the costs of litigation. Litigating the Penn 
Central standard is expensive for both property owners and the government. 
One reason is that the breadth of the factors considered under the Penn 
Central approach opens so many issues to discovery and factual controversy. 
Moreover, the legal standard’s vagueness makes it hard to estimate the 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992). 
 81. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Auth., 535 U.S. 302, 332 
(2002) (applying the Lucas rule); Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 (holding that prohibiting development constitutes 
a taking per se). 
 82. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987). 
 83. Lazarus, supra note 48, at 776. 
 84. Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 60, at 1179. 
 85. Id. 
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chances of success.86 This combination of factors impacts plaintiffs’ lawyers 
looking to statutory attorney’s fees for a prevailing party, since they must 
contemplate substantial investment in discovery and trial without being able 
to form reliable estimates of likely success.87 Property rights lawyers have 
consistently argued for bright-line rules that provide a better chance for 
summary judgment in favor of landowners.88 Here, Scalia’s preference for 
rules over standards favors plaintiffs, even beyond their consistent protection 
for owners, by reducing litigation costs and increasing the predictability of 
outcomes. Landowner threats of regulatory takings litigation inhibit land use 
regulators, who dread financing such litigation with limited public funds. 
III. BOGUS BASELINES 
The third and most significant character of Scalia’s takings 
jurisprudence was his strong reliance on a rigid common law baseline to 
assess whether a use regulation affected a taking. He depicts the common law 
of property as a simple, unchanging set of clear rules and maxims. In this, he 
reverted to the orientation of the pre-New Deal Court, which often used a 
common law baseline to assess and invalidate legislation.89 His first takings 
decisions demonstrate this strategy. Scalia’s strategy became more 
pronounced during his tenure, reaching its more complete statement in his 
plurality opinion in Stop the Beach, where he explicitly rejects evolution in 
the common law itself.90 Neither he nor any ally on the Court ever offered 
justification for using a crude caricature of the common law of property as a 
constitutional baseline. 
Scalia’s first and most convincing invocation of a common law baseline 
is in Nollan, where he repeatedly characterized the condition permitting the 
public to traverse the beach behind the Nollans’ house as an easement. This 
gave common law solidity to the building permit’s condition.91 The Court in 
Loretto foolishly invented the shibboleth that the right to exclude was such 
an essential stick in the property bundle, that any regulation authorizing 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Mark Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of Regulatory Takings, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 525, 
528 (2009). 
 87. Gideon Kanner, Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter-Century Retrospective on Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 679, 692 (2005). 
 88.  Cf. id. at 716 (asserting that courts have been unable or unwilling to create bright-line rules 
to help property owners pursue regulatory takings claims, thus implying that property owners’ attorneys 
have argued for these clear rules). 
 89. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 918 (1987) (explaining 
that cases built on Lochner use common law as a baseline). 
 90. See Byrne, Stop the Stop the Beach Plurality, supra note 42, at 629 (discussing Scalia’s 
opinion in Stop the Beach and the common law’s role in determining judicial takings). 
 91. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 828–29, 834, 837, 842 (1987). 
 
748 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 41:733 
permanent access was a per se taking.92 But the Court’s opinion in Lorretto 
had not characterized the problem as the taking of an easement. It had 
employed the modern “bundle of sticks” portrait of property, arguing that 
allowing a permanent physical occupation “chops through the bundle, taking 
a slice of every strand.”93 Scalia’s rhetorical move from the bundle of sticks 
to the taking of a common law interest dramatized the legal gravity of the 
public access, and helped justify the heightened means-ends scrutiny to be 
afforded such permitting conditions. 
Scalia reasonably grounded his characterization of the public access as 
an easement by referring to California state decisions requiring prescription 
to create public easements across private land.94 But the common law nature 
of public beach access was actively in flux at the time, as courts in many 
states were considering the implications of the Public Trust Doctrine for such 
access.95 California had affirmed a broad public trust interest allowing public 
access to tidelands (i.e., the beach seaward of the mean high-tide line), but 
had not discovered a public right to cross the dry sand beach to reach the 
tidelands.96 California’s Constitution suggested a public right of access to 
navigable waters.97 The State had given the Coastal Commission a mandate 
to enhance such public access.98 And the state court below had upheld the 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). 
 93. Id. at 435. 
 94. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 829. 
 95. See, e.g., State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 673 (Ore. 1969) (finding that the public 
has a right to access the beach); Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n., 471 A.2d 355, 358 (N.J. 
1984) (considering whether the Public Trust Doctrine gives the public a “right to gain access through and 
to use the dry sand area not owned by a municipality but by a quasi-public body”). Several European 
countries have elaborated in recent years a “right to roam,” which is a public right of access to unimproved 
private land for recreation. See, e.g., John A. Lovett, Progressive Property in Action: The Land Reform 
(Scotland) Act 2003, 89 NEB. L. REV., 739, 741 (2011) (discussing how Scottish law has changed to allow 
for more public access on lands “privately owned or public”); Kevin Gray & Susan Frances Gray, The 
Idea of Property in Land, in LAND LAW: THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES, 15, 38–39 (Susan Bright & John 
Dewar eds., 1998) (arguing that, with the need for recreation for a growing urban population, “an 
unanalysed, monolithic privilege of arbitrary exclusion is no longer tenable”). 
 96. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827–29, 841–42. 
 97. The California Constitution provides:  
No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or possessing the frontage or 
tidal lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, estuary, or other navigable water in this State, 
shall be permitted to exclude the right of way to such water whenever it is required 
for any public purpose, nor to destroy or obstruct the free navigation of such water; 
and the Legislature shall enact such laws as will give the most liberal construction 
to this provision, so that access to the navigable waters of this State shall be always 
attainable for the people thereof. 
CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4. 
 98. The California Coastal Act provides:  
In carrying out the requirement of Section 4 of Article X of the California 
Constitution, maximum access, which shall be conspicuously posted, and 
recreational opportunities shall be provided for all the people consistent with public 
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Commission’s imposing of this condition on the Nollans partly because the 
exactions program implemented the public’s interest in access to tidelands.99 
Thus, the California courts seemingly accepted the Coastal Commission’s 
exactions policy of trading building permits for larger oceanfront houses in 
exchange for lateral public access along the dry sand beach as a reasonable 
accommodation of competing values.100 The Commission sought to balance 
its statutory mandates of regulating private development and permitting 
public access on environmentally and culturally sensitive lands.101 
Scalia’s characterization of the case as involving the “extortion”102 of an 
easement lifted the property law question out of its complex legal context, 
stripping it to a question of the abstract rights of a landowner. The permit 
condition of public beach access becomes a “conveyance of property,” and 
the common law becomes the baseline of rights that the Takings Clause 
protects through heightened scrutiny.103 Scalia’s approach restricted the State 
to imposing an exaction only when the condition remedied a public harm 
directly caused by the permitting. In this way, the opinion prevented the State 
from resolving discord among legal principles and creating a broader 
accommodation between private and public interests, in a unique resource 
that has elements of an inherently public character.104 Scalia stripped a 
multidimensional California property scheme into a black-letter formula that 
protected the private owner’s interest. While this opinion displays Scalia’s 
impressive legal rhetorical craft, it initiates the pattern of abstracting the 
                                                                                                                 
safety needs and the need to protect public rights, rights of private property owners, 
and natural resource areas from overuse. 
 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30210 (2017). 
 99. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28, 31 (1987). 
 100. See id. at 30 (reaffirming the law as laid out in prior California cases). 
 101. The situation is analogous to Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 76–77, 83 
(1980). There, the California state constitutional rule permitting political demonstrations in private 
shopping centers was challenged as a taking of the right to exclude. The Court rejected that claim in an 
opinion by Justice Rehnquist, finding that, “[t]here is nothing to suggest that preventing appellants from 
prohibiting this sort of activity will unreasonably impair the value or use of their property as a shopping 
center.” Id. at 83. Scalia’s approach in Nollan is noteworthy for ignoring whether there was any 
impairment of the Nollans’ value or use of their property, while deciding the case solely on a conceptual 
basis. 
 102. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
 103. The opinion states:  
[O]ur cases describe the condition for abridgment of property rights through the 
police power as a ‘substantial advanc[ing]’ of a legitimate state interest. We are 
inclined to be particularly careful about the adjective where the actual conveyance 
of property is made a condition to the lifting of a land-use restriction, since in that 
context there is heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation 
requirement, rather than the stated police-power objective. 
Id. at 825 (second alteration in original). Thus, reasonable settlement of conflicting interests generated by 
different California legal instruments is reduced to an “abridgement of property rights” in violation of the 
federal constitution. Id. at 841. 
 104. Id. at 836–37. 
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property issues involved to simplified common law principles unqualified by 
the actual state law of property.105 Jurisprudentially, it turns from conceiving 
property as a bundle of rights that can be adjusted to achieve socially 
desirable legal contours, to classical property rights with clear and 
impermeable outlines. Scalia does not offer an explanation for the shift. He 
simply presents classical property rights as natural and correct. Scalia’s 
notion of property is all crystals and no mud.106 
Scalia’s use of a classical common law baseline for assessing the scope 
of the Takings Clause became more conspicuous in Lucas. His opinion 
characterizes the regulatory prohibition on Lucas, from building seaward of 
the historic tideline, as imposing a servitude.107 He rejected the older 
principle that a public regulation that prevents harm to the public cannot 
affect a taking. Instead,  he held that a land-use regulation that eliminated all 
economic value from a parcel of land would be a takings per se, unless it 
would “inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles 
of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land 
ownership.”108 The paradigmatic example used was the common law of 
nuisance, so that regulations prohibiting what would have been a nuisance at 
common law could not be a taking because they did not eliminate a property 
right.109 In Lucas, the Court doubted that prohibiting construction of single-
family houses, the “‘essential use’ of land,”110 could be a nuisance. The Court 
remanded the case with a warning: “South Carolina must identify 
background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses he 
now intends in the circumstances in which the property is presently found.”111 
Not only is the common law the baseline for the constitutional propriety of 
regulations, but also the Supreme Court should review state court decisions 
to see that they remain within the traditional context of state property law. 
                                                                                                                 
 105. The first circulated draft of Justice Brennan’s dissent in Nollan raised the influence of the 
public trust interest as a factor of support in the State’s position, arguing that the Court’s opinion failed to 
appreciate that “the State has employed its regulatory power not to acquire a ‘classic right-of-way 
easement,’ but to fulfill its public trust duty to preserve the common resources of the State for the use of 
its citizens.” William J. Brennan, Jr., First Draft of Dissenting Opinion, Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 
The Harry A. Blackmun Papers (June 3, 1987) (on file with the Collections of the Manuscript Division, 
Library of Congress), quoted in J. Peter Byrne, The Public Trust Doctrine, Legislation, and Green 
Property: A Future Convergence?, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 915, 921 (2012). 
 106. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 577–79 (1988) 
(referring to crystals as clear property rules and mud as murky rules). 
 107. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council 505 U.S. 1003, 1024 (1992). 
 108. Id. at 1029. 
 109. Id. at 1022. 
 110. Id. at 1031 (quoting Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911)). 
 111. Id. 
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Lucas highlights the perversity of using the common law as the baseline 
for assessing regulations, as commentators at the time noted.112 Land use 
regulations evolved because of structural limits on common law remedies to 
prevent public harms.113 Private nuisance law requires an adjoining 
landowner to allege harm to her property caused by the defendant’s use of 
her property. However, many uses generate serious harms on the public as 
whole, such as air pollution, but only minimal harms on the few adjoining 
landowners.114 In such circumstances, the individual plaintiff suffers 
insufficient harm to present a strong case, or even justify spending money to 
bring the suit. Public nuisance law was an early form of site-specific land-
use regulation; however, it was cumbersome and unsystematic, relying on 
inexpert attorneys general and courts to address increasingly complex public 
effects. As public land-use regulation became ubiquitous, nuisance law 
atrophied as courts refused to wield it against uses of land causing 
widespread harms and instead looked to public regulation as a superior legal 
instrument.115 In making common law the touchstone of constitutional 
appropriateness, Scalia thus inverted legal history and ignored the challenge 
of effectively addressing widespread public harms. Combined with the 
opinion’s express repudiation of the doctrine that regulations reasonably 
preventing harm to the public cannot be takings,116 using a common law 
baseline seemed to expose many environmental regulations to takings 
challenges. 
Scalia’s opinion in Lucas created paroxysms in the environmental 
community. This was not primarily because of the outcome, but because of 
the reasoning. The Court could have applied the Penn Central approach to 
David Lucas without serious reshaping of the law of regulatory takings. But 
the open-ended, fact specific Penn Central approach ran counter to Scalia’s 
jurisprudential instincts, as well as his deep distrust of discretionary 
government power. Penn Central embodies the most open-ended standard in 
                                                                                                                 
 112. Id. at 1030. “The legislature's role in land use is limited to codifying the common law of 
private disputes.” Louise Halper, Why the Nuisance Knot Can’t Undo the Takings Muddle, 28 IND. L. 
REV. 329, 337 (1995). 
 113. The Supreme Court itself stated long ago: “A person has no property, no vested interest, in 
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(“[A] landowner is entitled to use his own property, consistent with the law, in a manner calculated to 
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 115. James W. Sanderson & Ann Mesmer, A Review of Regulatory Takings After Lucas, 70 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 497, 507 (1993). 
 116. Id. at 507–08. 
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constitutional law because decisions will always be fact-specific. However, 
Scalia sought doctrinal clarity, which also erected a barrier against the growth 
of environmental regulation. The creation of the new per se rule, the rejection 
of the public harm approach, and the use of the common law nuisance 
baseline seemed to foretell a vigorous use of the Takings Clause to assault 
environmental regulations, which enjoyed substantial public support. 
In the last 25 years of his tenure, Scalia did not write another opinion for 
the Court in the area of regulatory takings. Most other justices, even those 
sympathetic to property rights claims, preferred a more pragmatic, less 
conceptual approach to accommodating individual rights and the need for 
regulation.117 Justice Kennedy concurred separately in Lucas, urging a more 
pragmatic approach, and he became an important swing vote in property 
rights cases.118 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in Dolan 
added a flexible proportionality inquiry to the conceptual Lucas test and 
specifically affirmed the public value of land-use regulation.119 
Scalia continued to advocate his more conceptually radical approach to 
constitutional property rights in his dissenting, concurring, and plurality 
opinions. His separate opinion in Pennell is revealing.120 The case involved 
a regulatory takings challenge to a rent control ordinance listing several 
factors that the city agency could consider in permitting rent increases, 
including whether the landlord’s proposed increase placed a severe economic 
hardship on a tenant.121 The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
remanded the case because the record lacked evidence as to whether the city 
had ever actually reduced rents due to a tenant hardship, precluding any 
inquiring into the economic effect on landlords.122 
[I]n this case we find that the mere fact that a hearing officer is 
enjoined to consider hardship to the tenant in fixing a landlord’s 
rent, without any showing in a particular case as to the 
consequences of that injunction in the ultimate determination of 
the rent, does not present a sufficiently concrete factual setting for 
the adjudication of the takings claim appellants raise here.123 
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Scalia’s separate opinion pressed the view that the power of the city to 
adjust rents based on the needs of the tenant was enough to violate the 
Takings Clause. The basic normative principle was “the unfairness of making 
one citizen pay, in some fashion other than taxes, to remedy a social problem 
that is none of his creation.”124 He argued that this principle, guaranteed by 
the Takings Clause, requires government to pay, and thus spread the costs of 
redistributive measures.125 “Here the city is not ‘regulating’ rents in the 
relevant sense of preventing rents that are excessive; rather, it is using the 
occasion of rent regulation (accomplished by the rest of the Ordinance) to 
establish a welfare program privately funded by those landlords who happen 
to have ‘hardship’ tenants.”126 The Takings Clause must resist such 
regulations to protect the integrity of the political process. “The politically 
attractive feature of regulation is not that it permits wealth transfers to be 
achieved that could not be achieved otherwise; but rather that it permits them 
to be achieved ‘off budget,’ with relative invisibility and thus relative 
immunity from normal democratic processes.”127 In Scalia’s view, “there is 
no end to the social transformations that can be accomplished by so-called 
‘regulation,’ at great expense to the democratic process,”128 if the regulation 
is not based on harm caused by the regulated owner. 
Scalia’s doctrinal approach here closely resembles that in the substantive 
due process cases of the pre-New Deal era. Thus, in Adkins v. Children’s 
Hospital, for example, the Court invalidated a statutory minimum wage for 
women and children.129 The Court explained: 
To the extent that the [wage] fixed exceeds the fair value of the 
services rendered, it amounts to a compulsory exaction from the 
employer for the support of a partially indigent person, for whose 
condition there rests upon him no peculiar responsibility, and 
therefore, in effect, arbitrarily shifts to his shoulders a burden 
which, if it belongs to anybody, belongs to society as a whole.130 
As the contractual wages in Adkins could not be regulated to address the 
needs of the workers, so the leases in Pennell should not be regulated to 
address the hardship of the tenant. In both cases, the rights created by the 
common law cannot be varied except for permissible public purposes. Both 
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the Adkins Court and Scalia in Pennell invoke natural justice in support of 
their views. However, Scalia adds to it a specious rationale of protecting the 
political process against itself.131 Ironically, Scalia joined the Court’s 
rejection of a substantive due process claim against the legislation, while 
duplicating the due process analysis under the auspices of the Takings 
Clause.132 Moreover, Scalia makes no attempt to justify his approach based 
on the original meaning of the Takings Clause. He refers only to “our 
traditional constitutional notions of fairness,” and says that the “fostering of 
an intelligent democratic process is one of the happy effects of the 
constitutional prescription—perhaps accidental, perhaps not.”133 
Scalia’s legal and normative claims in Pennell are thin and highly 
contestable. The federal constitution does not deprive states of power to 
impose social duties on landlordship in relation to tenant hardship. Rent 
control legislation does not need to take the current distribution of economic 
power between landlords and tenants, or between employers and employees, 
as a baseline.134 Property rules are frequently tempered by equity, which may 
generously consider the circumstances of the parties. Statutory eviction rules 
contain protections for elderly people and people subject to cold weather.135 
Scalia’s concept of property would render anything of this nature 
unconstitutional because it imposes duties on lessors for tenant problems not 
caused by the lessor. Such legal duties, even if based on humane social 
morality, may be counterproductive in practice. Also, if confiscatory, they 
would be found a taking under ordinary regulatory takings law.136 But to 
maintain such a substantive limitation on the regulation of property elevates 
a simplified understanding of the common law to constitutional status. 
Scalia was prepared to require compensation in Pennell without 
evidence of economic scale or effect. Again, as noted in the previous section, 
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he evinces little interest in the economic impact on the owner in any of these 
cases. He is far more interested in vindicating the integrity of property rights 
as he understands them. This can be seen again in the Court’s decisions in 
the IOLTA cases.137 That litigation addressed takings challenges to state 
programs, sometimes created by legislation and sometimes by state supreme 
court rules. These required lawyers to hold client funds too small in amount 
to justify individual client interest-bearing accounts to be placed in collective 
accounts where the interest would go to fund legal services for indigents.138 
The genius of these programs was that they took nothing from the client that 
he or she would otherwise have, since banks could not even open individual 
interest-bearing accounts in the small sums involved. 
The disputes, brought by property rights organizations, resulted in two 
Supreme Court decisions. In the first, Phillips v. Washington Legal 
Foundation, the Court held five to four in an opinion by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist that the interest generated in IOLTA funds belonged to the 
principal’s client owner.139 The opinion stressed heavily the common law 
maxim that ownership of interest follows that of the principal, an unusual 
example of majority reliance on a common law principal abstracted from 
context.140 The Court elevated the maxim above the actual law of the states, 
as applied to a novel circumstance, where the owner of the principal could 
never possess the interest.141 In the second, Brown v. Legal Foundation of 
Washington, the Court held, again five to four (O’Connor switched), that 
even if the program affected a taking, no compensation was due to petitioners 
because they suffered no net loss from the program.142 Justice Scalia wrote 
the dissent in Brown, which concluded: 
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Perhaps we are witnessing today the emergence of a whole new 
concept in Compensation Clause jurisprudence: the Robin Hood 
Taking, in which the government’s extraction of wealth from those 
who own it is so cleverly achieved, and the object of the 
government’s larcenous beneficence is so highly favored by the 
courts (taking from the rich to give to indigent defendants) that the 
normal rules of the Constitution protecting private property are 
suspended.143 
It is arresting but legally obtuse to describe the government’s actions as 
“larcenous.” It is striking that the government’s benign purposes in the 
IOLTA program are held against the government in the constitutional 
calculus. 
For Scalia, it is the articulation of constitutional rules protecting private 
property that are important, rather than compensating owners for unfair 
economic losses. The effect of finding the IOLTA programs to constitute 
takings would be to terminate the programs, not to restore wealth to the 
clients. As Justice Breyer convincingly explained:  
The most that Texas law here could have taken from the client is 
not a right to use his principal to create a benefit (for he had no 
such right), but the client’s right to keep the client’s principal 
sterile, a right to prevent the principal from being put to productive 
use by others.144 
The IOLTA cases exemplify Scalia’s and his conservative colleagues’ focus 
on using property to restrain government, rather than safeguard the specific 
economic assets at stake. 
Scalia’s embrace of common law property interests as baselines for 
constitutional protection is most clear in his judicial takings opinions. His 
interest in checking judicial expansion of public rights at the expense of 
private property dates to his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Stevens v. 
City of Cannon Beach.145 That case goes to the heart of the power of state 
supreme courts over the common law of property in their states. The Oregon 
Supreme Court had held 25 years previously that by customary usage the 
public had lawful access to the dry sand area of the State’s beaches, 
notwithstanding that private titles extended to the mean high tide line.146 In 
Stevens, the Oregon courts reaffirmed Thornton and the superiority of public 
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rights by upholding the denial of a permit to a private owner for development 
on their dry sand beach.147 In dissenting from the denial of certiorari, Justice 
Scalia wrote: 
As a general matter, the Constitution leaves the law of real 
property to the States. But just as a State may not deny rights 
protected under the Federal Constitution through pretextual 
procedural rulings, neither may it do so by invoking nonexistent 
rules of state substantive law. Our opinion in Lucas, for example, 
would be a nullity if anything that a state court chooses to 
denominate “background law”—regardless of whether it is really 
such—could eliminate property rights.148 
In support of his claims that the Oregon doctrine was a pretext or a 
“fiction,” Scalia argued further that the Oregon court misread Blackstone on 
the doctrine of custom rights.149 But it seems hard to conclude that a state 
supreme court’s interpretation of non-statutory property law that applies to 
the whole state is a “pretext,” regardless of how deficient the court’s 
reasoning was; it is actually what the law of the state is. U.S. courts relied on 
custom more broadly to permit access to unimproved private land than 
Blackstone knew.150 Several states have invoked custom or some notion of 
inherently public property to open the dry sand area of the state’s beaches to 
public access, thereby limiting private development.151 The common law has 
often developed through the reinterpretation of doctrines and even through 
the elaboration of fictions.152 The beach cases turn on the nature of the 
resource and its customary usage, rather than on any invidious assault on 
particular landowners or singling out of disfavored classes. But in Cannon 
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Beach, Scalia sought to find a federal constitutional handle on state property 
law changes that disadvantage private owners.153 
Justice Scalia finally advanced a full theory of judicial takings in Stop 
the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection.154 He wrote for a plurality of four justices, arguing that a state 
supreme court’s interpretation of its common law that eliminated an 
established property right must be invalidated as a taking.155 The Court 
concluded that the Florida Court had not changed its interpretation of littoral 
owners’ rights in the foreshore and thus did not take property.156 Scalia’s 
opinion is a travesty of the common law. Maintaining that judicial 
innovations in the common law of property present takings problems 
misconstrues the nature of the judicial function. Courts have and must evolve 
law in a tension that preserves legitimate expectations of owners and adapts 
the rules to changing social, economic, and environmental conditions.157 As 
Professor Joseph Sax wrote in regard to Lucas, “Historically, property 
definitions have continuously adjusted to reflect new economic and social 
structures, often to the disadvantage of existing owners.”158 Standard 
property law casebooks brim with cases and legislation that adopt new 
substantive and remedial rules. No property rule can be changed without 
eliminating somebody’s established right.159  
Loretto held that a regulation abridging the right to exclude was a per se 
taking,160 on the ground that the right to exclude is the most crucial aspect of 
property. Scalia’s opinion in Stop the Beach elevates all property rights to 
that status.161 In that case, he was prepared to hold that a state interpretation 
of common law that reduced littoral rights to touch the sea could be a taking 
without regard to its economic effect or reasonableness.162 The only question 
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was whether the state court’s current decision could be squared with state 
precedent. This is formalism on steroids and deeply reactionary. Scalia 
offered no normative or jurisprudential justification for such a rule; he 
assumed constitutional protection for all established rights, and directed his 
arguments to extending the principle from legislation to common law 
adjudication.163  
“Judicial takings” claims should be analyzed under substantive due 
process because they attack changes in rules rather than applications of a rule 
to particular properties. The constitutional issue is whether the state court’s 
change of a rule is a legitimate exercise of its authority, not whether it 
imposes a loss on some people. This becomes apparent in Justice Scalia’s 
view as to how a judicial taking is to be remedied: the state supreme court 
must reverse its holding and adhere to the older state property rule.164 In short, 
the state court’s decision is invalidated—the typical remedy for a due process 
violation. Scalia posits that the law could be changed by the legislature as 
some kind of categorical exercise of eminent domain, and the state can 
appropriate funds to compensate all affected property owners.165 
Judges interpret gaps and ambiguities in precedent to make new law 
much more often than they simply announce a change in rule. Stop the Beach 
and Lucas both portend Supreme Court review of state court decisions to 
evaluate whether the current interpretation of property law is consistent with 
past interpretations. This erects a falsely clear and static image of the 
common law of property as a bulwark against regulation. It had nothing to 
do with the Takings Clause. The Court unanimously stated in Lingle that 
regulations are takings when their “effect is tantamount to a direct 
appropriation.”166 Scalia’s approach departs from this functional inquiry into 
economic effects and fairness to individuals. Instead, he uses property to limit 
the scope of regulatory authority. 
CONCLUSION 
The title of this essay plays upon Justice Kennedy’s statement in 
Palazzolo. He rejected a per se rule that would bar an owner from bringing a 
takings claim against a regulation enacted before the owner acquired the 
property subject to the regulation.167 He said, “[T]he State may not put so 
potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle.”168 To claim that Justice 
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Scalia puts Lockean sticks into a Hobbesian bundle is to argue that he 
employs pre-political natural property rights to ward off government 
regulators insatiably hungry for private property. His opinions display no real 
interest in property law as such. His consideration of common law doctrines 
is summary and simplistic. The opinions reveal no concern about the 
economic effects of land use regulation or the complex intertwining of 
crystals and mud.169 Despite serving on the Court during a virtual Golden 
Age of property law scholarship, encompassing many different 
jurisprudential and political perspectives, he rarely cited and never discussed 
this literature. He seems to have viewed property law from the outside, as a 
bulwark against government regulation, rather than as a complex system of 
resource allocation and usage rights. In short, he embraced property from a 
public law perspective as a check on government power. 
Scalia depicts government purposes in land use regulation as 
consistently malevolent, driven by a lust for power. The complex patterns of 
government decision-making get reduced to “legislative fiat” or “judicial 
decree.”170 In Scalia’s rhetoric, government uses regulatory power 
irrationally, engages in extortion, creates nature preserves on private land, 
forces landlords to pay to address social problems they did not create, 
engages in larceny, and relies on fictitious legal doctrines to eliminate 
property rights. Justice Scalia rarely and grudgingly recognized that 
government regulation can prevent harm to the public from pollution or 
environmental degradation, or enhance public goods. He articulated a 
consistently dark vision of democracy and human nature. 
We can speculate that Scalia was alarmed by the potential claims of 
environmentalism on traditional private rights. Many of his cases addressed 
regulations of sensitive environmental areas, such as the waterfront, where 
regulations of land use have increased. Environmental science has made 
apparent the many ways in which development of private land can impair air 
and water quality, habitat for wildlife, or the value of ecological services. 
Environmental understanding reveals ubiquitous externalities from private 
property use that could justify nearly any reasonably thought-out regulation 
as seeking to force their internalization in order to prevent harm to the public. 
Scalia seems to have believed that a police power of such breadth would 
inevitably become oppressive. 
Scalia’s regulatory takings jurisprudence creates a conceptual barrier 
against regulation of land use for environmental ends. The use of per se rules 
eliminates the Court’s weighing of public purposes. His Pennell approach 
narrows the range of permissible government ends, and Nollan raises the bar 
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for achieving them. Requiring compensation for any elimination of an 
established property right locks in place the current distribution of rights 
without regard to the public needs. These doctrinal innovations block 
wholesome environmental regulations as well as interest group rent seeking; 
they do not seek to distinguish between them. 
Professor Margaret Radin wrote a perceptive analysis of Scalia’s 
approach in Nollan soon after the opinion was announced, which captures 
important aspects of his overall body of opinions regarding regulatory 
takings. She wrote: 
The model of rules is a conservative interpretation of the Rule of 
Law, or at least congenial to conservatives, because it ties in so 
well with the Hobbesian view of politics. If majority rule is a 
shifting coalition of rent seekers, then democratic government is a 
Leviathan to be restrained . . . . Unless judges can be so 
completely restrained as to be rendered mere tools of 
implementation of the real social contract—without which citizens 
cannot be expected to yield their arbitrary powers against others—
citizens are caught between the predations of the majority and the 
predations of the judiciary, and the social contract dissolves . . . . 
In this model of human nature, limitless self-interest and the 
consequent urgent need for self-defense require the most 
expansive possible notion of private property, indeed, the classical 
liberal conception of property. Nothing will get produced unless 
people are guaranteed the permanent internalization of the benefits 
of their labor; nobody will restrain herself from predation against 
others unless all are restrained from predation against her.171 
Scalia took this conceptual cabining of regulation through the Takings 
Clause further than any other conservative justices concerned about 
excessive land use regulation. Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Kennedy, 
all of whom wrote opinions strengthening the regulatory takings doctrine, 
also expressly recognized the validity and necessity of land use regulations. 
They also used analytic approaches that considered the fairness to and 
pragmatic effects of regulations on property owners. Scalia’s approach was 
too doctrinaire and lacked grounding in shared legal reasoning. 
The future of Scalia’s property rights jurisprudence remains unclear. 
President Trump has named Scalia as the model of an ideal Supreme Court 
appointment. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito seem more inclined to 
embrace his regulatory takings legacy, as evidenced by their joining the 
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plurality opinion in Stop the Beach, than did Chief Justice Rehnquist or 
Justice O’Connor. One might envision the Court returning to the concepts 
sketched in Scalia’s regulatory takings opinions, employing per se rules that 
ignore the public justification for regulations while protecting a static, 
fundamentalist right of property. 
But the imperative of devising new laws to shape a healthier and more 
harmonious relation of advanced society to nature remains. Property law 
needs to evolve so that stewardship of resources and care for creation sit 
alongside economic efficiency and personal liberty. Climate change will 
drive the demand for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and the adaptation 
to accelerating ecological transformation. Rather than a model for the future, 
Justice Scalia’s regulatory takings jurisprudence stands as a caution against 
refusing to confront the challenge environmental risk poses to our liberal 
legal order. 
